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What’s the Harm in Having a “Harm 
Principle” Enshrined in Section 7 of 
the Charter? 
Paul Burstein* 
I can still remember back in the early 1980s sitting in my under-
graduate “Constitutional Law” class, being taught by the venerable 
constitutional scholar, Peter Russell, about the “pending” political 
power shift we could soon expect in light of the newly minted Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I remember hearing him tell us that 
less than two years earlier, Canada had acquired a new constitutional 
document which had the potential to make individual citizens more 
powerful than the entire government of Canada. Ignoring the more in-
teresting political debate about the appropriate boundaries between the 
legislative and judicial branches of government, I was awed by the no-
tion that this “Charter” could be so powerful. Was it some kind of book 
of magic spells? As the lecture continued, and Professor Russell spoke 
of laws being “struck down”, I began to conceive of it being more like 
the sacred chest in “Raiders of the Lost Ark”, capable of firing bolts of 
holy lightning at evil government legislators. When I finally bothered to 
read the text book which had been assigned for Professor Russell’s 
course, I soon came to realize that the power of the Charter, while more 
benign than the sorcery I had imagined, resided more in the imagination 
of the lawyers and judges who would be asked to define the vague con-
tours of the rights expressed in the Charter’s guarantees. Wanting in on 
some of that action, I quickly set off to law school in the hopes of ac-
quiring the tools necessary to build one of those Charter challenges. 
I have had the distinct privilege and pleasure of being part of a 
number of different Charter challenges over the years, challenges which 
                                                                                                                                
* I am indebted to my friend and colleague, Professor Alan Young, for his assistance 
in piecing together this paper. It is based on facta which the two of us have filed mounting 
these arguments in courts as well as on a previously written paper. 
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have relied upon a variety of different Charter rights. None have proven 
to be as interesting as the challenges to the federal legislation criminal-
izing the personal possession of marijuana. Apart from the fascinating 
evidentiary record which my colleague, Professor Alan Young, and I 
created in support of that challenge, we were provided with an opportu-
nity to expand the scope for judicial review of the “wisdom” of certain 
criminal prohibitions. Put differently, the novel legal issue raised by R. 
v. Clay1 was the extent to which section 7 of the Charter provides a 
mechanism for judicial review of stupid “criminal” laws. 
I. DO WE EVEN NEED TO RECOGNIZE A “HARM PRINCIPLE” IN 
SECTION 7 OF THE CHARTER? 
No one disputes that section 7 of the Charter entitles a rights claim-
ant to argue that Parliament has gone too far in the manner by which it 
has defined a criminal offence. Ever since the mid 1980s, with the Su-
preme Court’s decisions in Motor Vehicle Reference2 and R. v. Vaillan-
court,3 we have known that section 7 of the Charter imposes some 
restrictions on how the State can define criminal conduct. However, the 
decisions in those cases did not go so far as to say that section 7 of the 
Charter imposed limits on the State’s ability to choose whether or not 
certain conduct could be criminalized at all. No one was arguing that the 
State could not criminalize being part of a robbery where someone is 
killed, or that the State could not impose “criminal” sanctions for driv-
ing while one’s licence has been suspended. The question in those cases 
was simply whether proof of the offence, as it had been defined, would 
necessarily mean that all of those offenders would be deserving of the 
punishment to be imposed, irrespective of whether their conduct had the 
                                                                                                                                
1  R. v. Clay, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 735, [2003] S.C.J. No. 80, as well as its two companion 
cases R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, were 
decided on (23 December 2003). Some of the Charter issues which Professor Young and I 
raised in Clay were disposed of in the reasons delivered in the companion cases. For ease of 
reference, and as a result of a lawyer’s self-indulgent pride, I will refer to the decisions 
collectively as “the Clay trilogy”.  
2.  Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 23 
C.C.C. (3d) 289. 
3  [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, 39 C.C.C.(3d) 118 (S.C.C.). See also, R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen 
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 906, 59 C.C.C. (3d) 161. 
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potential to cause harm to society. But what about a situation where 
proof of the offence, as defined by the State, is not necessarily commen-
surate with the offender having caused any real harm to society? For 
example, imagine if the government suddenly decided to criminalize 
golfing with all the attendant threats which attach to criminal offences 
(i.e., jail, fines, probation and a criminal record). While no one would 
deny that there is a remote possibility of golfers causing harm to them-
selves (e.g., as a result of being struck by lightning while on the course) 
or to others (e.g., by striking them with an errant golf shot), is this the 
kind of stuff of which criminal law is made? Is it contrary to the “prin-
ciples of fundamental justice” to enact criminal laws which do not serve 
the public interest by protecting people from harm, or is this purely a 
question of policy best left to elected officials? Is there room for a sec-
tion 7 Charter challenge when it appears that there is no constructive 
purpose behind a criminal prohibition? 
The scope of judicial review of legislation under section 7 of the 
Charter is dependent upon two factors; namely, the interpretation of the 
terms “life”, “liberty” and “security of the person” and the discovery of 
the “principles of fundamental justice”. While the threshold issue con-
cerning “life, liberty and security” serves as a gatekeeper to judicial 
review of legislation, when the analysis is undertaken in the context of a 
criminal prohibition, this threshold will almost always be met by virtue 
of the threat of imprisonment and/or the stigma associated with a crimi-
nal prohibition.4 Accordingly, I propose to focus on the more elusive 
questions concerning the content of section 7’s “principles of fundamen-
tal justice”. 
                                                                                                                                
4 The distinction between the mere “threat” of imprisonment as opposed to the actual 
“use” of imprisonment is relied upon by the majority in R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 
571, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, in its analysis of whether or not the potential deprivation of liberty 
accords with the “principles of fundamental justice”. The majority, in seeming contradiction 
to the tenor of earlier Supreme Court of Canada cases (e.g., Reference re Motor Vehicle Act 
(British Columbia) S. 94(2), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, Reference re British Columbia at 492, 
[1985] S.C.J. No. 73 and R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154, [1991] 
S.C.J. No. 79), held that while the threat of punishment may be enough to engage a rights 
claimant’s “liberty” interest, the “principles of fundamental justice” focus on the likelihood 
that the person will actually go to jail for the impugned offence.  
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II. ARE THERE EXISTING ALTERNATIVES TO THE “HARM 
PRINCIPLE” AS A MEANS OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW OF CRIMINAL 
PROHIBITIONS? 
The search for specific principles of fundamental justice which arise 
out of the “basic tenets of the legal system” has proved to be a difficult 
exercise. It may appear helpful for the Court to remind us that “section 7 
must be construed having regard to those interests and against the appli-
cable principles of policies that have animated legislative and judicial 
practice in the field”,5 yet the problems remain in identifying principles 
of justice which deserve the label of “fundamental”. Seven years after 
the Motor Vehicle Reference, the Court had another opportunity to bet-
ter explain how we are to discover the principles of fundamental justice. 
In Rodriguez,6 the Court addressed the question of whether the criminal 
prohibition on assisted suicide violated section 7 of the Charter because 
of the impediment it created for disabled people wanting to end their 
lives as a release from chronic pain and suffering. The Court rejected the 
argument that respect for human dignity is a “principle of fundamental 
justice” on the basis that “dignity” is too vague a concept to constitute a 
principle of fundamental justice. As for the process by which we are to 
discern these principles of fundamental justice, the Court stated: 
 Discerning the principles of fundamental justice with which 
deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person must accord, in order 
to withstand constitutional scrutiny, is not an easy task. A mere common 
law rule does not suffice to constitute a principle of fundamental justice, 
rather, as the term implies, principle upon which there is some consensus 
that they are vital or fundamental to our societal notion of justice are 
required. Principles of fundamental justice must not, however, be so broad 
as to be no more than vague generalizations about what our society 
considers to be ethical or moral. They must be capable of being identified 
with some precision and applied to situations in a manner which yields an 
understandable result. They must also, in my view, be legal principles.7 
In Rodriguez, the Court had also reminded us of the need to respect 
the traditional roles of the legislative branch as compared to the judicial 
                                                                                                                                
5  R. v. Beare; R. v. Higgins, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387, at 402-403, [1988] S.C.J. No. 92. 
6  Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, [1993] 
S.C.J. No. 94. 
7  Id., at 590-91. 
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branch of government. At the same time, however, the Court recognized 
that respect for this traditional division of powers does not mean that 
courts are precluded from reviewing legislation for compliance with 
substantive principles of fundamental justice: 
 On the one hand, the Court must be conscious of its proper role in the 
constitutional make-up of our form of democratic government and not 
seek to make fundamental changes to long-standing policy on the basis of 
general constitutional principles and its own view of the wisdom of 
legislation. On the other hand, the Court has not only the power but the 
duty to deal with this question if it appears that the Charter has been 
violated. The power to review legislation to determine whether it 
conforms to the Charter extends not only to procedural matters but also 
substantive issues. The principles of fundamental justice leave a great deal 
of scope for personal judgment and the Court must be careful that they do 
not become principles which are of fundamental justice in the eye of the 
beholder only.8 
Without identifying a specific principle of fundamental justice, the 
Court upheld the prohibition on assisted suicide on the basis that the 
state had two overriding interests: the existence of a perceived consen-
sus in favour of an absolute prohibition on assisted suicide and the goal 
of preventing abuse and exploitation of vulnerable individuals. At the 
most basic level of analysis, all that happened in this case was a balanc-
ing of the interest at stake, namely, of Ms. Rodriguez’s interest in 
choosing death against the societal interests represented by the prohibi-
tion. There did not appear to be a clearly defined principle of fundamen-
tal justice that was being debated by members of the Court. 
Two years later, the Court resolved another difficult and sensitive 
rights claim with a similar balancing act. In B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid 
Society,9 the Court addressed the issue of whether a child’s compulsory 
blood transfusion, over the religious objections of his parents, violated 
section 7 of the Charter. Although the Court was badly divided on the 
threshold issue of “liberty and security” a majority of the Court con-
cluded that the legislation providing for the compelled transfusion was 
constitutional because the fundamental rights of the parents were out-
                                                                                                                                
8  Id. at 589-90 [emphasis in original]. 
9  B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, 
[1995] S.C.J. No. 24. 
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weighed by the State’s right to protect the life and health of children 
(and because this objective had been pursued in a manner consistent 
with fair process).  
Less than two years after the Court had first introduced this “balanc-
ing” approach to section 7 (in its 1993 decision in Cunningham v. Can-
ada),10 the Court was now saying that “fundamental justice in our 
Canadian legal tradition ... is primarily designed to ensure that a fair 
balance be struck between the interests of society and those of its citi-
zens”.11 In fact, in one of the most recent pronouncements from the 
Court on the meaning of “fundamental justice”, it is clear that the search 
for specific principles has been overtaken by the allure of simply bal-
ancing the individual interests at stake with the public interest promoted 
by the impugned legislation: 
 The principles of fundamental justice are to be found in “the basic 
tenets of our legal system”…: “They do not lie in the realm of general 
public policy but in the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of the 
justice system”… The relevant principles of fundamental justice are 
determined by a contextual approach that “takes into account the nature of 
the decision to be made”… The approach is essentially one of balancing. 
As we said in Burns, “[i]t is inherent in the...balancing process that the 
outcome may well vary from case to case depending on the mix of 
contextual factors put into the balance”.12 
Simply put, as recently as 2002, the year before the Clay trilogy was 
argued before the Court, it seemed well settled that, if nothing else, 
section 7’s “principles of fundamental justice” included (1) a balancing 
of the individual interests at stake with the societal interests promoted 
by the legislation and (2) a consideration of the context of the impugned 
legislation (or state action). 
Any doubt about the primacy of the balancing approach to section 
7’s “principles of fundamental justice” should have been laid to rest by 
                                                                                                                                
10  [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143, [1995] S.C.J. No. 47. 
11  Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research Re-
strictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, at 583, [1990] S.C.J. No. 23. 
12  Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 
[2002] S.C.J. No. 3, at para. 45. 
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the Court’s 1997 decision in Godbout v. Longueuil (City).13 In Godbout, 
after expressly confirming that there is a substantive component to sec-
tion 7 of the Charter,14 the Court made clear that the “principles of fun-
damental justice” require a balancing of the state’s interest with the 
relevant “life”, “liberty” or “security of the person” interest: 
 But just as this Court has relied on specific principles or policies to 
guide its analysis in particular cases, it has also acknowledged that 
looking to “the principles of fundamental justice” often involves the more 
general endeavour of balancing the constitutional right of the individual 
claimant against the countervailing interests of the state. In other words, 
deciding whether the principles of fundamental justice have been 
respected in a particular case has been understood not only as requiring 
that the infringement at issue be evaluated in light of a specific principle 
pertinent to the case, but also as permitting a broader inquiry into whether 
the right to life, liberty or security of the person asserted by the individual 
can, in the circumstances, justifiably be violated given the interests or 
purposes sought to be advanced in doing so. To my mind, performing this 
balancing test in considering the fundamental justice aspect of s. 7 is both 
eminently sensible and perfectly consistent with the aim and import of that 
provision, since the notion that individual rights may, in some 
circumstances, be subordinated to substantial and compelling collective 
interests is itself a basic tenet of our legal system lying at or very near the 
core of our most deeply rooted juridical convictions. We need look no 
further than the Charter itself to be satisfied of this. Expressed in the 
language of s. 7, the notion of balancing individual rights against 
collective interests itself reflects what may rightfully be termed a 
“principle of fundamental justice” which, if respected, can serve as the 
basis for justifying the state’s infringement of an otherwise sacrosanct 
constitutional right.15 
Consistent with American due process analysis, the Court appeared to 
have accepted that the countervailing state interest had to be both “com-
pelling and substantial”.16 As for defining the substantive “principles of 
fundamental justice”, the only guidance provided by the Godbout case 
                                                                                                                                
13  [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, 152 D.L.R. (4th) 577. See also R. v. Morgentaler [1988], 1 
S.C.R. 30, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 449 and R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 68. 
14  Supra, note 13, at 619 (D.L.R.). 
15  Supra, note 13, at 620 (D.L.R.). 
16  However, it remained unclear whether this high standard only applied when the state 
interference pertained to decisions of a fundamental, personal nature. 
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was that the substantive component of section 7 allows a court to assess 
the “ends” sought to be achieved by a legislature to determine if these 
“ends” are consistent with the basic tenets of both our judicial system 
and our legal system more generally.  
In view of its seemingly well-settled existence, as an alternative to 
urging the Court to recognize and apply the “harm principle”, in the 
Clay trilogy we had advanced an alternative argument under the balanc-
ing approach. The appellants’ arguments in this regard are concisely 
summarized (and accepted) by Lebel J., writing for himself in dissent: 
 The process of delineation of rights under s. 7 unavoidably involves 
balancing competing rights and interests (R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 
at p. 715). In this respect, concerns about the harm done to society or 
some of its members or even to the accused themselves must be weighed 
together with the consequences which flow from the criminalization of 
simple possession. A balancing of this nature must occur when it is 
asserted that the liberty interest of the accused has been infringed in a way 
that is inconsistent with the tenets of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the 
Charter. Such an analysis is not as narrowly focused as a review of a 
punishment under s. 12 of the Charter where courts must determine 
whether a specific penalty should be considered as cruel and unusual 
because of its grossly disproportionate nature. 
 In the course of a s. 7 analysis, the inquiry of the Court is more 
subtle, broader, and more difficult. Although the availability of 
imprisonment triggers the inquiry into the applicability of s. 7, the 
investigation must move beyond the sole question of the penalty and the 
courts must take into account all relevant factors viewed as a whole, in 
order to determine whether a breach of fundamental rights has been made 
out. It is made out if and when the response to a societal problem may 
overreach in such a way as to taint the particular legislative response with 
arbitrariness. (See for example, Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 47; Godbout v. Longueuil 
(City), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844, at para. 76; R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 
577, at pp. 621, 625.) 
 On the evidence which is available in this appeal, such a legislative 
overreach happened. I do not need to engage in any additional review of 
this evidence, given that it was carefully reviewed and discussed by my 
colleagues. I will not even attempt to summarize it again. In my mind, it 
cannot be denied that marihuana can cause problems of varying nature and 
severity to some people or to groups of them. Nevertheless, the harm its 
consumption may cause seems rather mild on the evidence we have. In 
contrast, the harm and the problems connected with the form of 
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criminalization chosen by Parliament seem plain and important. Few 
people appear to be jailed for simple possession but the law remains on 
the books. The reluctance to enforce it to the extent of actually jailing 
people for the offence of simple possession seems consistent with the 
perception that the law, as it stands, amounts to some sort of legislative 
overreach to the apprehended problems associated with marihuana 
consumption. Moreover, besides the availability of jail as a punishment, 
the enforcement of the law has tarred hundreds of thousands of Canadians 
with the stigma of a criminal record. They have had to bear the burden of 
the consequences of such criminal records as Arbour J. points out. The 
fundamental liberty interest has been infringed by the adoption and 
implementation of a legislative response which is disproportionate to the 
societal problems at issue. It is thus arbitrary and in breach of s. 7 of the 
Charter.17 
The majority dismissed this argument on the basis that a general balanc-
ing of interests under the auspices of the “principles of fundamental 
justice” would improperly merge the section 7 inquiry with the section 1 
analysis: 
 We do not think that these authorities should be taken as suggesting 
that courts engage in a free-standing inquiry under s. 7 into whether a 
particular legislative measure “strikes the right balance” between 
individual and societal interests in general, or that achieving the right 
balance is itself an overarching principle of fundamental justice. Such a 
general undertaking to balance individual and societal interests, 
independent of any identified principle of fundamental justice, would 
entirely collapse the s. 1 inquiry into s. 7.18 
The majority’s reasoning on this point was directed more at the argu-
ment that, because the balancing approach under section 7 was so simi-
lar to that done under section 1 of the Charter, the burden should 
similarly shift to the government to demonstrate that a criminal offence 
provision which deprives a person of life, liberty or security of the per-
son is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. That 
issue, however, had nothing to do with whether or not the “principles of 
fundamental justice” require a generalized balancing of the interests at 
stake. Yet, it was in an effort to remove societal interests from the mix 
that the Court relegated the “balancing approach” to a subsidiary role 
                                                                                                                                
17  R. v. Malmo-Levine, supra, note 1, at paras. 278-80 and paras. 179-82. 
18  Id., at para. 96 [emphasis in original]. 
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within the “principles of fundamental justice” stage of the section 7 
analysis: 
 The balancing of individual and societal interests within s. 7 is only 
relevant when elucidating a particular principle of fundamental justice. As 
Sopinka explained in Rodriguez … “in arriving at these principles [of 
fundamental justice], a balancing of the interest of the state and the 
individual is required” (pp. 592-93 [emphasis omitted]). Once the principle 
of fundamental justice has been elucidated, however, it is not within the 
ambit of s. 7 to bring into account such “societal interests” as health care 
costs. Those considerations will be looked at, if at all, under s. 1....19 
The reference to the single (partial) line quotation from Rodriguez does 
little (or nothing) to “elucidate” why the Court’s previous decisions, 
such as Godbout, were being overturned. Consequently, in addition to 
eradicating any hope of developing a “harm principle” as a basis for 
substantive review of legislation under section 7’s “principles of funda-
mental justice”, the Clay trilogy has also managed to erase years of 
jurisprudential advances on the “balancing approach”.20 
Even had the majority not rejected the “balancing approach”, we 
had always recognized the limitations of relying on this approach as a 
mechanism for seeking judicial review of the merits of criminal prohibi-
tions on “lifestyle choices” (e.g., the “vice” offences referred to above). 
When resisting the section 7 Charter challenges in the earlier cases, the 
government had always argued that the Court should only undertake 
exacting constitutional scrutiny under the “principles of fundamental 
justice” when the law interferes with the right to decisions of “funda-
mental personal importance”. For example, in Morgentaler,21 the Court 
was faced with having to categorize the right of a woman to decide what 
would be best for her and her unborn child. In B. (R.), it was the right of 
parents to prevent a medical intervention inconsistent with their reli-
gious beliefs. In Rodriguez, the issue concerned the right of a disabled 
person to choose when to end her life just as a non-disabled person 
                                                                                                                                
19  Id., at para. 98. 
20  Indeed, much could be written on how the majority has greatly altered, if not, evis-
cerated the “balancing approach” which the Court had developed over a long line of cases, 
beginning with Cunningham, supra, note 10, in 1993. However, because the focus of this 
paper is the “harm principle”, that discussion is left to another day. 
21  R. v. Morgentaler (1988), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 449, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1.  
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could.22 It is obvious that the Charter will be trivialized if its guarantees 
extend to any personal decisions, including those which are picayune 
and petty. On the other hand, creating a category of “fundamental per-
sonal decision” does not help define the scope of the constitutional lim-
its imposed by section 7 of the Charter. Dividing personal decisions into 
“fundamental” and “non-fundamental” is a value-laden exercise not well 
suited for the judicial arena. More importantly, designating a decision as 
“fundamental” does not assist because the Supreme Court has not pro-
vided any specific methodology for assessing the constitutionality of 
state interference with “fundamental”, as opposed to “non-
fundamental”, decisions.23  
One might wonder why we would even attempt to develop a new 
substantive principle of fundamental justice given the balancing ap-
proach that had been repeatedly adopted by the Court over the past 10 
years. However, as noted above, the problem with relying upon this 
balancing approach with respect to section 7 challenges to consensual 
crimes had always been the need to get over two hurdles: (1) whether 
the constitutional demand for an overriding and compelling state interest 
applies only to “decisions of a fundamental personal nature” and (2) 
whether consensual pleasure-seeking activities involve decisions of a 
fundamental personal importance. Despite the fact that a strong philoso-
phical argument can be made for characterizing hedonistic pursuits as 
involving fundamental decisions, it had always proven difficult to per-
suade the judiciary to accept this proposition. Indeed, one of the few 
points which all nine Supreme Court justices agreed upon in the Clay 
trilogy was that, even taking the “widest view on liberty” or interpreting 
“security as including the right to personal autonomy”, section 7 did not 
cover the recreational use of marijuana, even in the privacy of one’s 
home. 
                                                                                                                                
22  One would have thought that these cases all involved fundamental, personal deci-
sions and, yet, the s. 7 constitutional challenge succeeded only in the Morgentaler case, and 
did so primarily on procedural concerns (not upon any substantive principle of fundamental 
justice). In the other two cases, the Court balanced competing interests and found that a state 
interest outweighed the decision of “fundamental personal importance”. 
23  Moreover, as the B. (R.) and Rodriguez cases both show, persuading the court that 
the personal decision should be categorized as “fundamental” does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that state interference is unconstitutional. 
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Regarding the other facing a successful challenge, the majority deci-
sion in the Clay trilogy has implicitly removed the need for the counter-
vailing state interest to be “compelling or substantial”.24 After having 
rejected the “harm principle” (which I will discuss more fully below), 
the majority went on to address the “balancing approach” argument 
which we had advanced in alternative to the “harm principle” argument. 
As noted above, the majority declined to follow the general “balancing” 
approach which the Court had employed on a number of prior substan-
tive section 7 challenges. Moreover, as also noted above, the majority 
seems to have dispensed with the “balancing approach” argument on the 
basis that “it is not within the ambit of s. 7 to bring into account such 
‘societal interests’ as health care costs. Those considerations will be 
looked at, if at all, under s. 1.”25 On the other hand, the majority was 
quite willing to recognize the “avoidance of harm” as a valid state inter-
est in assessing whether the adverse effects of criminalization of mari-
juana possession were “disproportionate to any threat posed by 
marihuana use”.26 At first blush, one is hard pressed to understand what 
the difference could be between a “balancing” approach and a “dispro-
portionality” approach; either way, the issue is whether the harm caused 
by the criminal prohibition outweighs the harm prevented by the crimi-
nal prohibition. Reading further along in the majority’s reasons sheds 
light on why they may have been trying to draw this distinction without, 
in my view, a difference. By framing the debate in terms of “dispropor-
tionality”, the majority was able to shift the test along the spectrum into 
the much narrower realm of “gross disproportionality”: 
                                                                                                                                
24  As Arbour J. points out (in “Scalia-like” fashion), Gonthier J. (one of the authors of 
the majority opinion in the Clay trilogy) in his dissenting reasons in R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 
S.C.R. 452, stated at 522-3: 
  
 ... the avoidance of harm to society is but one instance of a fundamental concep-
tion of morality.... 
 
First of all, the moral claims must be grounded. They must involve concrete problems 
such as like, harm, well-being, to name a few, and not merely difference of opinion or of 
taste. Parliament cannot restrict Charter rights simply on the basis of dislike; this is what is 
meant by the expression “substantial and pressing” concern. 
25  Id., at para. 98. 
26  Id., at para. 141. 
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 In short, after it is determined that Parliament acted pursuant to a 
legitimate state interest, the question can still be posed under s. 7 whether 
the government’s legislative measures in response to the use of marihuana 
were, in the language of Suresh, “so extreme that they are per se 
disproportionate to any legitimate government interest” (para. 47 
(emphasis added)). As we explain below, the applicable standard is one of 
gross disproportionality, the proof of which rests on the claimant.27 
Moreover, in recognizing that the “avoidance of harm” was a valid state 
interest within the rule against arbitrary or irrational state conduct men-
tioned in Rodriguez — a variant of the “balancing” approach28 — the 
majority held that once it has been demonstrated that the harm is not de 
minimis (or not insignificant or trivial), “the precise weighing and calcu-
lation of the nature and extent of the harm is Parliament’s job”.29 In 
other words, unless and until Parliament decides to re-institute corporal 
or capital punishment, it appears that a criminal prohibition aimed at 
“non-trivial” harm will be neither constitutionally irrational or dispro-
portionate. 
Apart from resorting to section 7’s general balancing approach, an-
other alternative to developing a whole new substantive principle of 
fundamental justice might have been the attempted expansion of two 
already accepted principles of fundamental justice; namely, the vague-
ness30 and overbreadth31 doctrines. For either of these, however, the 
constitutional principles permit only a form of indirect judicial review of 
the criminal prohibition, as both doctrines are predicated on reviewing 
only the means chosen to achieve the legislative ends. The necessity of 
invoking the criminal law to achieve those ends is not questioned as part 
of this review process. However, it can be assumed that if the state has 
                                                                                                                                
27  Malmo-Levine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at paras. 143 and 159-62. 
28  In Malmo-Levine, id., at para. 90, the majority relied on the following passage from 
Rodriguez [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at 594 to illustrate the “rule against arbitrary or irrational 
state conduct”: 
 Where the deprivation of the right in question does little or nothing to enhance 
the state’s interest (whatever it may be), it seems to me that a breach of fundamental 
justice will be made out, as the individual’s rights will have been deprived for no 
valid purpose. 
29  Supra, note 27, at para. 133. 
30  R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, [1992] S.C.J. No. 
67; Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1028, [1995] S.C.J. No. 6. 
31  R. v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101. 
172  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
only a vague sense of the need to create the prohibition in the first place 
this will translate into an ill-defined and overly general law. While much 
could be written about the vagueness doctrine, the sad reality is that it is 
constitutionally toothless. The way in which the Supreme Court has 
characterized and constructed the vagueness doctrine ensures that it 
could only serve to invalidate the most poorly-defined offence imagin-
able.32 The Court has actually only invalidated one provision on the 
basis of the vagueness doctrine (denial of bail in the “public interest”),33 
and there is little chance that the doctrine will fare any better in the 
realm of consensual crime.  
Despite one seemingly bold invalidation by the Court,34 the future 
of the overbreadth doctrine as a means for substantive review under 
section 7 is even bleaker. In Clay, relying on Rodriguez, we had argued 
that the criminal prohibition on marijuana does little to enhance the 
State’s objective as it is grossly overbroad and ineffective. In R. v. Hey-
wood, the Court had characterized the overbreadth analysis as follows: 
Overbreadth analysis looks at the means chose by the state in relation to 
its purpose. A court must consider whether those are means necessary to 
achieve the state objective. If the state, in pursuing a legitimate objective, 
uses means which are broader than is necessary to accomplish that 
objective, the principles of fundamental justice will be violated because 
the individual’s rights will have been limited for no reason. The effect of 
overbreadth is that in some applications the law is arbitrary or 
disproportionate.35 
In light of Heywood, we had submitted that in order to accord with the 
overbreadth principle, the harm caused by a legislative provision cannot 
be disproportionate to the harm prevented by it; that is, a “not insignifi-
cant” level of prevented harm cannot justify a legislative provision 
                                                                                                                                
32  As demonstrated by Arbour J.’s opinion in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth 
and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, the majority opinion that has 
effectively raised the bar on the test for vagueness so high as to render the doctrine meaning-
less. 
33  R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, [1992] S.C.J. No. 98. 
34  See R. v. Heywood, supra, note 32. Of course, as the Court was quick to observe in 
Heywood, the impugned legislation had since been replaced. In other words, the Court was 
prepared to rely upon the overbreadth doctrine to strike down a piece of legislation which no 
longer existed. 
35  Supra, note 31, at 764. 
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which seriously harms the interests section 7 of the Charter was in-
tended to protect. The essence of our argument is found in the following 
paragraph in our Factum: 
27. As the Crown’s own expert, Dr. Kalant, acknowledged, the vast 
majority of cannabis users are moderate users who do not present any risk 
of harm to themselves or others. Indeed, both the trial Judge in Clay (and 
the Ontario Court of Appeal) recognized this fact: 
However, to be fair, there is also general agreement among the 
experts who testified that moderate use of marijuana causes no 
physical or psychological harm. Field studies in Greece, Costa Rica 
and Jamaica generally supported the idea that marijuana was a 
relatively safe drug — not totally free from potential harm, but 
unlikely to create serious harm for most individual users or society. 
[Emphasis in Factum.] 
However, the criminal prohibition on cannabis does not distinguish 
between those few whose consumption presents a potential risk of some 
harm (assuming that harm is sufficiently serious to justify criminal 
sanctions) and those for whom moderate consumption presents little or no 
risk of any harm. Yet, the criminal prohibition attaches criminal sanctions 
to all users, regardless of whether it is their first, second or tenth time 
using cannabis. Even though the Crown’s expert estimates that there are 
only about 30,000 chronic users in Canada for whom there is some risk of 
harm, the criminal prohibition has adversely impacted upon no less than 
600,000 Canadians. Crudely put, the criminal prohibition needlessly 
causes harm to 20 people for every one person who might benefit from the 
putative deterrent effects of the law. From another perspective, the gross 
overbreadth of the criminal prohibition on cannabis means that the 
overwhelming majority of convicted offenders have “not really done 
anything wrong” and that we are convicting them to prevent harm to the 
small percentage of chronic users: see B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, 
infra.36 
While this point found favour with the three dissenting justices, espe-
cially with Deschamps J., the majority’s response was, as noted above, 
to import the “gross disproportionality” requirement from section 12 of 
                                                                                                                                
36  Appellant Clay’s Factum (S.C.C. Court File #28189), on file with S.C.C. and with 
author, para. 27. 
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the Charter into the overbreadth analysis.37 As the majority’s reasons go 
on to show, this is a threshold that will rarely be met: 
 We agree that the effects on an accused person of the criminalization 
of marihuana possession are serious. They are the legitimate subject of 
public controversy. They will undoubtedly be addressed in parliamentary 
debate. Applying a standard of gross disproportionality however, it is our 
view that the effects on accused persons of the present law, including the 
potential of imprisonment, fall within the broad latitude within which the 
Constitution permits legislative action.38 
III. WORKING TO DEVELOP THE “HARM PRINCIPLE” AS A  
PRINCIPLE OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 
It would be impossible to mount a challenge premised upon a crimi-
nal prohibition’s lack of social utility without the support of social science 
evidence calling into question the foundation for the prohibition’s exis-
tence. It does not appear that this type of evidence was introduced on any 
of the earlier incarnations of this type of challenge, such as in the Prosti-
tution Reference.39 If the assessment of legislative objectives is to be 
made as part of a section 7 claim (as opposed to waiting for the stage of 
the litigation where the government tries to justify a violation), then the 
rights claimant bears the burden of proving the violation.40 Rhetorical 
                                                                                                                                
37  Were one to be so cynical as to believe that the majority was engaging in result-
oriented reasoning, it is easy to understand why it was compelled to reformulate the over-
breadth test by raising the bar through use of the word “gross” to qualify the standard of 
disproportionality. In addition to the repeated and consistent criticisms of the criminal prohi-
bition on marijuana that are found in the professional literature and in law reform papers, two 
Parliamentary committees had very recently found that the consequences of the Canadian 
criminal prohibition were “disproportionate” to the harms which the prohibition was hoping 
to prevent. Of course, once the operative test became “gross disproportionality” those recent 
governmental findings were of little use to the majority. 
38  Malmo-Levine, supra, note 27, at para. 175. 
39  Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 
1123. 
40  Although much of the information relating to legislative objectives will be uniquely 
in the possession of the Crown, it will be incumbent upon the rights claimant to discharge a 
persuasive burden relating to proof of the absence of sound policy supporting the enactment. 
As noted above, this was a subsidiary issue raised in the Clay trilogy; namely, whether s. 7 of 
the Charter contemplates a “shifting burden” such that the state may, in certain situations, be 
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flourishes by counsel will not suffice. Invalidation will require a careful 
marshaling of legislative facts. As the Supreme Court of Canada has said 
on two different occasions: 
 Charter cases will frequently be concerned with concepts and 
principles that are of fundamental importance to Canadian society. For 
example, issues pertaining to freedom of religion, freedom of expression, 
and the right to life, liberty and the security of the individual will have to 
be considered by the courts. Decisions on these issues must be carefully 
considered as they will profoundly affect the lives of Canadians and all 
residents of Canada. In light of the importance and the impact that these 
decisions may have in the future, the courts have every right to expect and 
indeed to insist upon the careful preparation and presentation of a factual 
basis in most Charter cases. The relevant facts put forward may cover a 
wide spectrum dealing with scientific, social, economic and political 
aspects. Often expert opinion as to the future impact of the impugned 
legislation and the result of the possible decisions pertaining to it may be 
of great assistance to the courts.  
 Charter decisions should not and must not be made in a factual 
vacuum. To attempt to do so would trivialize the Charter and inevitably 
result in ill-considered opinions.41 
As with the Prostitution Reference, the Supreme Court in Butler,42 
dismissed the claim that the obscenity prohibition was unconstitution-
ally vague. However, while Butler did not directly provide support for a 
claim that section 7 permits judicial review of the merits of the law, 
there were two aspects of this case which became integral to the quest 
for a sound juridical basis for challenging the constitutionality of con-
sensual crimes on the basis of their lack of social utility. First, in Butler, 
the Supreme Court rejected “legal moralism” as a sound justification for 
criminal law. The Court stated that “to impose a certain standard of 
public and sexual morality, solely because it reflects the conventions of 
a given community, is inimical to the exercise and enjoyment of indi-
vidual freedoms”.43 The rejection of legal moralism (and perhaps its 
                                                                                                                                
called upon to justify why it has criminalized a certain activity. The majority rejected this 
contention. 
41  MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357, at 361, [1989] S.C.J. No. 88; Danson v. 
Ontario (Attorney General) [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086, [1990] S.C.J. No. 92. 
42  R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, [1992] S.C.J. No. 15, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 129. 
43  Id., at 156. 
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distant relative, legal paternalism) suggested that a harm-based justifica-
tion must support the enactment of criminal law. The type of harm and 
the level of proof of harm was not addressed in Butler, save and except 
for the Court’s finding that, in the context of obscenity, Parliament was 
acting upon a “reasoned apprehension of harm”.44  
Following Butler, Professor Young and I began to work on con-
structing a harm-based constitutional challenge to the gambling provi-
sions based upon an extensive record of legislative facts showing that 
“legalized” gambling had become an everyday Canadian pastime. Pro-
vincial governments were amassing huge revenues from the recent ex-
plosion in regulated gambling. We argued that the intense involvement 
of the State in gambling activities completely undercut the argument 
that gambling was harmful to society. Surely the province would not 
engage in activities contrary to the public interest, and their decision to 
promote gambling showed that there has been a change in social, politi-
cal and moral perspectives on gambling. Armed with Butler, we argued 
that the “harm principle” is a principle of fundamental justice which 
required Parliament to have a “reasoned apprehension of harm” before it 
could enact constitutionally-sound criminal prohibitions. Ultimately, the 
constitutional challenge to the gambling provisions failed on the basis 
that the Ontario Court of Appeal found that, despite the proliferation of 
government-run gambling ventures, there still remained some degree of 
harm warranting resort to the criminal law. As a result of its factual 
finding, the Court provided no comment relating to whether it consid-
ered the harm principle to be a principle of fundamental justice.45 
IV. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE “HARM PRINCIPLE” 
To what extent can the “harm principle” be considered a principle of 
fundamental justice? When does a principle become a “basic tenet” of 
criminal justice policy? These questions do not have simple answers. 
Presumably, the fundamental nature of a principle can be demonstrated 
by showing that it is consistent with other accepted principles of justice. 
A vibrant principle against self-incrimination was largely constructed by 
the Supreme Court on the basis of a synthesis of interconnected princi-
                                                                                                                                
44  Id., at 164. 
45  R. v. Andriopolous, [1994] O.J. No. 3630 (C.A.). 
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ples of common law, statutory law, constitutional law and policy.46 
Similarly, as nine provincial appellate court justices — the three mem-
bers of the B.C. Court of Appeal in Malmo-Levine, the three members 
of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Clay and the three members of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal in Murdock47 — and Arbour J. (dissenting in 
the Clay trilogy) all recognized, support for a “harm principle” can be 
traced back to our common law traditions and to other constitutional 
rights and principles.48 
We can begin with a look to some of the cases decided under the 
constitutional predecessor to the Charter, namely, the Constitution Act, 
1867. One need only turn to the scope of constitutional review under the 
Constitution Act, 1867 to see that courts are constitutionally empowered 
to review legislative determinations of harm. With respect to the crimi-
nal law power under section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the 
following summary of the scope of section 91(27) has been repeatedly 
adopted by the Supreme Court in “division of powers” cases: 
The traditional root of discussions in this field is found in Russell v. The 
Queen (1882), 7 App. Cas. 829 (P.C.), where Sir Montague E. Smith said 
at p. 839: 
Laws...designed for the promotion of public order, safety or morals 
and which subject those who contravene them to criminal procedure 
and punishment, belong to the subject of public wrongs rather than to 
that of civil rights...and have direct relation to the criminal law. 
That there are limits to the extent of the criminal authority is obvious 
and these limits were pointed out by this Court in The Reference as to 
the Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act (Margarine 
Reference), [1949] S.C.R. 1, aff’d [1951] A.C. 179, where Rand J. 
looked to the object of the statute to find whether or not it related to 
the traditional field of criminal law, namely public peace, order, 
security, health and morality. In that case, the Court found that the 
object of the statute was economic:... 
                                                                                                                                
46  See R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, 57 C.C.C. (3d) 1, and R. 
v. S. (R.J.) [1995] 1 S.C.R. 451, 96 C.C.C. (3d) 1. 
47  R. v. Murdock, [2003] O.J. No. 2470 (C.A.). 
48  It was upon these same considerations that all three justices of the B.C. Court of Ap-
peal came to recognize the “harm principle” as a principle of fundamental justice in R. v. 
Malmo-Levine, supra, note 27. 
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The test is one of substance, not form, and excludes from criminal 
jurisdiction legislative activity not having the prescribed characteristics of 
criminal law: 
“A crime is an act which the law, with appropriate penal sanctions, 
forbids; but as prohibitions are not enacted in a vacuum, we can 
properly look for some evil or injurious or undesirable effect upon the 
public against which the law is directed. That effect may be in 
relation to social, economic or political interests; and the legislature 
has had in mind to suppress the evil or the safeguard the interest 
threatened.” [Reference re Validity of Section 5(a) of Dairy Industry 
Act, Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. AG Que. et al. (the 
Margarine case), [1949] S.C.R. 1 at 49, [1949] 1 D.L.R. 433 at 472-
3, aff’d [1951] 4 D.L.R. 689 (P.C.) (Rand J.).] (emphasis added)49 
The Margarine Case50 provides a perfect example of the constitutional 
proposition that “there are limits to the extent of criminal authority”.51 
In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated a criminal prohibition on the 
sale of margarine on the basis that the original legislative assumption of 
harm (i.e., that margarine was injurious to health) was no longer valid in 
light of new scientific evidence, and in light of the fact that the govern-
ment itself was importing and selling margarine during the war. Origi-
nally, the law had conformed to the harm principle, but with the passage 
of time this “reasoned apprehension of harm” had disappeared. This 54-
year old decision provides significant support for the elevation of the 
“harm principle” into a principle of fundamental justice. 
The spirit of the Margarine Case lives on in contemporary constitu-
tional adjudication. Whether a court was balancing interests under sec-
tion 7 or under section 1, Charter challenges to legislation have always 
required a court to assess the social utility of an impugned law. For 
example, in balancing the competing interests at issue in Rodriguez, the 
Court noted: 
Where the deprivation of the right in question does little or nothing to 
enhance the state’s interest (whatever it may be), it seems to me that a 
                                                                                                                                
49  Labatt Breweries of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914, at 
943. 
50  Reference re Validity of section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act (Margarine Case), 
[1949] 1 D.L.R. 433 (S.C.C.); affd [1950] 4 D.L.R. 689 (P.C.). 
51  Supra, note 49. 
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breach of fundamental justice will be made out, as the individual’s rights 
will have been deprived for no valid purpose.52 
In the context of criminal law, asserting that a provision “does little or 
nothing to enhance the state’s interest” is another way of saying that the 
law does not protect society from the harm which the law was designed 
to prevent. 
In 1997, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dismissed another chal-
lenge which was based upon an early incarnation of the “harm princi-
ple”. In dismissing the Charter challenge, the Court focused on the lack 
of evidence calling into question the social utility to the consensual 
crime of incest among adults: 
 The analysis of these arguments must be undertaken with the 
recognition that the appellants have the burden of proving on the balance 
of probabilities that their fundamental rights are violated by the law in 
question. In that respect, I note that the appellants have not presented any 
evidence that indicates that incest between consenting adults is permitted 
by the law of any other civilized nation, nor have they filed any articles or 
learned publications, law reform commission papers or other material that 
supports their position that “recreational” sexual activity with blood 
relations should be legalized and constitutionally protected.53  
Based upon this passage, it became apparent that the prohibition on 
marijuana possession would be an opportune case for advancing the 
harm principle as a constitutional tool for decriminalizing consensual 
crimes. In contrast to the criminal prohibition on incest, the criminal 
prohibition on marijuana has been strongly criticized by a vast body of 
academic literature54 and by virtually every commission of inquiry to 
have studied the issue, including the 1972 Canadian LeDain Commis-
sion. In addition, many other civilized nations have already changed 
their prohibitory policies with respect to marijuana possession. Finally, 
for the past decade (or more) there has been considerable public support 
for law reform in this area. Perhaps the incest, obscenity, prostitution 
and gambling provisions are supported by a “reasoned apprehension of 
                                                                                                                                
52  Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at 594. 
53  R. v. F. (R.P.) (1996), 105 C.C.C. (3d) 435, at 441 (N.S.C.A.). 
54  The literature on this issue is too voluminous to note for this brief paper, but it has 
been summarized in the Joint Statement of Legislative Facts filed in the appeal to the Su-
preme Court of Canada in the Clay trilogy (and is on file with the author). 
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harm”, but with respect to marijuana, there is a wide array of legislative 
facts which casts serious doubt upon the legitimacy of this criminal 
prohibition. 
The “harm principle” challenge to the prohibition on marijuana pos-
session initiated in the Clay case55 was predicated on the introduction of 
an extensive body of expert evidence from the fields of history, sociol-
ogy, psychiatry, criminology, pharmacology and medicine. Ultimately, 
the challenge was dismissed at trial, primarily on the basis that the ques-
tion of harm is primarily a political question best left to the policy de-
terminations of a legislature. The trial judge did not conclude that the 
harm principle was a principle of fundamental justice. However, in 
order to facilitate further judicial review in the appellate courts, the trial 
judge agreed to make findings of fact with respect to the evidence of 
“harm” which had been presented. Despite rejecting the legal basis for 
the constitutional challenge, the trial judge made the following findings 
of legislative fact: 
 
1.  Consumption of marijuana is relatively harmless compared to the 
so-called hard drugs and including tobacco and alcohol; 
2.  There exists no hard evidence demonstrating any irreversible organic 
or mental damage from the consumption of marijuana; 
3.  That cannabis does cause alteration of mental functions and as such, 
it would not be prudent to drive a car while intoxicated; 
4.  There is no hard evidence that cannabis consumption induces 
psychoses; 
5.  Cannabis is not an addictive substance; 
6.  Marijuana is not criminogenic in that there is no evidence of a causal 
relationship between cannabis use and criminality; 
7.  That the consumption of marijuana probably does not lead to “hard 
drug” use for the vast majority of marijuana consumers, although 
there appears to be a statistical relationship between the use of 
marijuana and a variety of other psychoactive drugs; 
                                                                                                                                
55  R. v. Clay (1997), 9 C.R. (5th) 349, [1997] O.J. No. 3333 (Gen. Div.). 
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8.  Marijuana does not make people more aggressive or violent; 
9.  There have been no recorded deaths from the consumption of 
marijuana; 
10.  There is no evidence that marijuana causes amotivational syndrome; 
11.  Less than 1% of marijuana consumers are daily users; 
12.  Consumption in so-called “de-criminalized states” does not increase 
out of proportion to states where there is no de-criminalization; 
13. Health related costs of cannabis use are negligible when compared to 
the costs attributable to tobacco and alcohol consumption.56 
Subsequent to the Clay case, the trial judge in Malmo-Levine, faced with 
almost the identical record of legislative facts, reached virtually identi-
cal findings of fact. In addition to the minimal harms putatively avoided 
by the criminal prohibition, the British Columbia court provided an 
overview of the social harms which are caused by the criminal prohibi-
tion: 
 
1.  countless Canadians, mostly adolescents and young adults, are being 
prosecuted in the “criminal” courts, subjected to the threat of (if not 
actual) imprisonment, and branded with criminal records for 
engaging in an activity that is remarkably benign (estimates suggest 
that over 600,000 Canadians now have criminal records for cannabis 
related offences); meanwhile others are free to consume society’s 
drugs of choice, alcohol and tobacco, even though these drugs are 
known killers; 
2.  disrespect for the law by upwards of one million persons who are 
prepared to engage in the activity, notwithstanding the legal 
prohibition; 
3.  distrust, by users of health and educational authorities who, in the 
past, have promoted false and exaggerated allegations about 
marijuana; the risk is that marijuana users, especially the young, will 
no longer listen, even to the truth; 
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4.  lack of open communication between young persons and their elders 
about their use of the drug or any problems they are experiencing 
with it, given that it is illegal; 
5.  the risk that our young people will be associating with actual 
criminals and hard drug users who are the primary suppliers of the 
drug; 
6.  the lack of governmental control over the quality of the drug on the 
market, given that it is only available on the black market; 
7.  the creation of a lawless sub-culture whose only reason for being is to 
grow, import and distribute a drug which is not available through 
lawful means; 
8.  the enormous financial costs associated with enforcement of the law; 
and 
9.  the inability to engage in meaningful research into the properties, 
effects and dangers of the drug, because possession of the drug is 
unlawful.57 
Both of these cases were appealed. Both the Ontario and British Co-
lumbia Courts of Appeal concluded that the harm principle is a substan-
tive principle of fundamental justice. The Ontario Court of Appeal 
adopted the following statement made by a majority of the B.C. Court of 
Appeal (per Braidwood J.A.): 
 I conclude that on the basis of all of these sources — common law, 
Law Reform Commissions, the federalism cases, Charter litigation — that 
the “harm principle” is indeed a principle of fundamental justice within 
the meaning of s. 7. It is a legal principle and it is concise. Moreover, 
there is a consensus among reasonable people that it is vital to our system 
of justice. Indeed, I think that it is common sense that you do not go to jail 
unless there is a potential that your activities will cause harm to others... 
the proper way of characterizing the “harm principle” in the context of the 
Charter is to determine whether the prohibited activities hold a “reasoned 
apprehension of harm” to other individuals or society … The degree of 
harm must be neither insignificant nor trivial.58 
                                                                                                                                
57  R. v. Malmo-Levine (1999), 145 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at 240-41, [1999] B.C.J. No. 1095 
(C.A.). 
58  Id., at 274-75. 
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Despite recognizing that the “harm principle” was a principle of funda-
mental justice, the Ontario Court of Appeal, and a majority of the Brit-
ish Columbia Court of Appeal, dismissed the constitutional challenges 
to the marijuana prohibition on the basis that there was some evidence 
to support a conclusion that “marihuana poses a risk of harm to others 
that is not insignificant nor trivial.”  
In his discussion of the reports from Canadian law reform commis-
sions over the past few decades, Braidwood J.A. specifically noted the 
1969 Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections (Ouimet Re-
port), which had asserted that harm to society was a precondition to 
legislative resort to a criminal prohibition: 
The Committee then adopted the following three criteria as “properly 
indicating the scope of criminal law”: 
1.  No act should be criminally proscribed unless its incidence, actual or 
potential, is substantially damaging to society. [Emphasis in original.] 
2.  No act should be criminally prohibited where its incidence may 
adequately be controlled by social forces other than the criminal 
process.  
3.  No law should give rise to social or personal damage greater than that 
it was designed to prevent.59 
Like the majority in the Supreme Court who ultimately disagreed with 
him, Braidwood J.A. also took note of a 1982 Government of Canada 
policy statement with respect to the purposes and principles of the 
criminal law, stating that: 
The basic theme, however, is important, in stressing that the criminal law 
ought to be reserved for reacting to conduct that is seriously harmful. The 
harm may be caused or threatened to the physical safety or integrity of 
individuals, or through interference with their property. It may be caused 
or threatened to the collective safety or integrity of society through the 
infliction of direct damage or the undermining of what the Law Reform 
Commission terms fundamental or essential values—those values or 
interests necessary for social life to be carried on, or for the maintenance 
of the kind of society cherished by Canadians. Since many acts may be 
“harmful”, and since society has many other means for controlling or 
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responding to conduct, criminal law should be used only when the harm 
caused or threatened is serious, and when the other, less coercive or less 
intrusive means do not work or are inappropriate.60 
Based on his review of “all of these sources — common law, Law Re-
form Commissions, the federalism cases, Charter litigation”, Braidwood 
J.A. had no difficulty finding that the “harm principle” (1) is a legal 
principle, (2) which is precise and (3) which enjoys a consensus among 
reasonable people that it is vital to our system of justice.61 
Before turning to the Supreme Court’s response to the “harm prin-
ciple”, it is worth noting that, Prowse J.A., dissenting in the B.C. Court 
of Appeal’s decision in Malmo-Levine, had adopted a slightly more 
robust formulation of the “harm principle” than had her colleague 
Braidwood J.A., before then going on to hold that the trial judge’s find-
ings did not satisfy the constitutionally requisite level of harm: 
While I agree with Mr. Justice Braidwood that the risk of harm to society 
from simple possession of marijuana is not insignificant or trivial, and that 
the evidence of the trial judge justifies the findings she made in that 
regard, I do not agree that this is the appropriate formulation of the test to 
be applied in these circumstances. Rather, I would interpret the Butler test 
as justifying Parliament in imposing criminal law sanctions to prohibit 
specified activity if there is a reasoned apprehension of harm of a 
“serious”, “substantial” or “significant” nature, whether or not actual harm 
can be established. 
 I find support for this formulation of the relevant test to be applied in 
this case in the detailed discussion of the “harm principle”, and its 
relationship to the criminal law, set forth at paras. 97 to 130 of Mr. Justice 
Braidwood’s reasons. He refers to numerous authorities in that regard, 
drawn from the common law, leading treatises on the criminal law, the 
work of law reform commissions, Canadian “federalism” cases, and 
leading Charter cases, including Butler and Sharpe. 
. . . 
 In my view, none of the cases referred to by either Judge Howard or 
by Mr. Justice Braidwood supports a finding that a lesser degree of harm 
than described in those passages would justify Parliament’s intervention 
through the imposition of criminal law sanctions. 
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. . . 
 In summary, it is apparent from Mr. Justice Braidwood’s discussion 
of the “harm principle” in relation to Parliament’s use of criminal law 
sanctions, that the level or degree of harm, or apprehended harm, which 
justifies Parliament’s intervention through its use of such sanctions 
(whether under s. 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (criminal law) or 
under the residual power to make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of Canada) must be harm of a “serious”, “significant” or 
“substantial” nature. It is not sufficient to say that the apprehended harm 
be “non-trivial” or “insignificant”. In my view, those words posit too low 
a threshold to justify Parliament’s intervention through the imposition of 
criminal law sanctions. 
 As earlier stated, the findings of Judge Howard, based on the 
evidence before her, do not amount to a finding of a reasoned risk of 
serious, substantial or significant harm to society or to others from the 
mere possession (or use) of marijuana. If there is evidence available which 
would gainsay this conclusion, it was not placed before the trial judge, nor 
is it before us on this appeal.62 
This difference in the formulation of the “harm principle” was much 
more than hair-splitting. Had Braidwood J.A. shared Prowse J.A.’s view 
of the appropriate test for “harm”, Braidwood J.A.’s reasons make clear 
that a unanimous B.C. Court of Appeal would have been satisfied that 
the legislative facts did not support the constitutionally requisite level of 
harm. It was on the strength of Prowse J.A.’s dissent that the “harm 
principle” and its applicability to the criminal prohibition on marijuana 
possession made their way up to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Following the appellate court decisions in Malmo-Levine and in 
Clay, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in R. v. Murdock,63 decided another 
constitutional challenge to a drug offence that had been mounted on the 
basis of the “harm principle”. The accused in Murdock had been con-
victed of “trafficking by offer”; that is, he had been found to have of-
fered to sell a drug to an undercover officer when he did not in fact have 
any drug to sell. Counsel challenged the offence of “trafficking by of-
fer” on the basis that there was no harm caused by the mere offer to sell 
someone a drug when no drug was actually sold. Though it ultimately 
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rejected the challenge, the Court did again recognize that the “harm 
principle” is a substantive principle of fundamental justice. However, 
the Court also made clear that the formulation of the “harm principle” 
which it was prepared to recognize provided only a very narrow scope 
for judicial review of the merits of a criminal prohibition. Writing for 
the majority, Doherty J.A. said: 
[para27] I am spared much of the intellectual heavy lifting involved in a 
consideration of this submission. Braidwood J.A. in a well reasoned 
analysis in R. v. Malmo-Levine (2000), 145 C.C.C. (3d) 225 at 246-82 
(B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 490, 
accepted that the “harm principle” was a principle of fundamental justice. 
He framed the principle in these words at p. 275: 
The proper way of characterizing the “harm in the criminal law can 
be a nebulous and unruly standard. The harm principle, like other 
principles of fundamental justice, does not give the judiciary licence 
to review the wisdom of legislation: Creighton, supra, at p. 378; 
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (A.G.), supra, at p. 65.  
[para31] Nor should the harm principle be taken as an invitation to the 
judiciary to consecrate a particular theory of criminal liability as a 
principle of fundamental justice. This is so even if that theory has gained 
the support of law reformers, some of whom also happen to be judges. 
Judicial review of the substantive content of criminal legislation under s. 7 
should not be confused with law reform. Judicial review tests the validity 
of legislation against the minimum standards set out in the Charter. Law 
reform tests the legal status quo against the law reformer’s opinion of 
what the law should be. 
[para32] The nature and degree of harm said to justify resort to the 
criminal sanction is a matter of debate among philosophers and criminal 
law theorists. To some, harmful conduct has a broad meaning 
encompassing any conduct which threatens or harms any legitimate 
individual or societal interest: Canada, Department of Justice, The 
Criminal Law in Canadian Society (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 
1982) at p. 45. Others prefer a more restricted notion of harm. Some reject 
self-harm as a basis for the imposition of criminal liability because it is 
unduly paternalistic. Still others reject public morality [See Note 3 below] 
as an appropriate basis upon which to impose the criminal sanction: A. 
Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1985, chap. 2); J.P. McCutcheon, “Morality in the Criminal Law: 
Reflections on Hart-Devlin” (2002) 47 Crim. L.Q., at p. 15.  
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[para33] It is not for the judiciary under the guise of applying the harm 
principle as a principle of fundamental justice to choose from among the 
competing theories of harm advanced by criminal law theorists. The harm 
principle, as a principle of fundamental justice, goes only so far as to 
preclude the criminalization of conduct for which there is no “reasoned 
apprehension of harm” to any legitimate personal or societal interest. If 
conduct clears that threshold, it cannot be said that criminalization of such 
conduct raises the spectre of convicting someone who has not done 
anything wrong. Difficult questions such as whether the harm justifies the 
imposition of a criminal prohibition or whether the criminal law is the best 
way to address the harm are policy questions that are beyond the 
constitutional competence of the judiciary and the institutional 
competence of the criminal law adversarial process. [footnote omitted] 
[para35] With respect, having concluded that the relevant statutory 
provisions accorded with the harm principle, I do not agree that a further 
consideration of whether the provisions struck “the right balance” was 
mandated by the harm principle as a principle of fundamental justice. In 
my view, the harm principle as described by Braidwood J.A. 
(Malmo-Levine, supra, at p. 275) itself reflects the balancing of societal 
and individual interests required by s. 7. The state interest is the protection 
of individuals in the community from the harm occasioned by the conduct 
in issue. The individual interest is the right to be left alone by the state. 
The harm principle, as described by Braidwood J.A., balances those 
competing interests by directing that the state can interfere with individual 
autonomy by way of a criminal prohibition only where there is a reasoned 
apprehension of harm occasioned by the conduct of the individual. To 
engage in a further balancing process based on harm related concerns, 
after it is determined that the impugned legislation complies with the harm 
principle, leads inevitably to a review of policy choices and goes beyond 
protecting those who have done nothing wrong from the criminal sanction. 
For example, I do not think that considerations of the overall harm caused 
to the due administration of justice by the criminalization of conduct has 
anything to do with whether criminalization of that conduct offends the 
harm principle. The effect of criminalization on the overall administration 
of justice is an important question, but it is a policy question which is not 
germane to the judicial review contemplated by s. 7 of the Charter. 
[para36] In holding that the harm principle as a principle of fundamental 
justice contemplates only a determination of whether the prohibited 
conduct presents a reasoned apprehension of harm, I do not suggest that 
the substantive review of crime creating statutes is limited to that narrow 
question. The harm principle is but one of several related principles of 
fundamental justice that are engaged on a substantive review of criminal 
legislation. Principles of fault, overbreadth, vagueness, and gross 
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proportionality between the harm caused and the punishment imposed are 
among the principles of fundamental justice that are germane to a 
substantive review of criminal legislation under s. 7: see R. v. Smith, 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045; R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society (No. 2), 
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 606; R. v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761. In addition, 
other specific provisions of the Charter impose constitutional limits on the 
availability of the criminal law sanction: see R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 
731.64 
Unless and until the Supreme Court were to say otherwise, it appeared 
that, in Ontario at least, the scope of review afforded by the “harm prin-
ciple”, would be extremely limited. Indeed, it was my view at the time 
that if the record and findings of legislative fact in Clay did not fall 
below the harm principle’s dividing line, there would be few, if any, 
existing criminal prohibitions which would fail the Ontario Court of 
Appeal’s test for the minimum level of constitutionally required harm. 
V. THE SUPREME COURT TAKES THE BITE OUT  
OF THE HARM PRINCIPLE 
Prior to the release of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Clay tril-
ogy of cases, Professor Stuart had commented on the significance of the 
Court’s pending judgment in these appeals: 
 The harm principle awaits the imprimatur of the Supreme Court. If 
accepted, it would introduce a welcome new vehicle for restraint and give 
teeth to years of rhetoric about the need to use the criminal sanction with 
caution. The Braidwood test appears as workable as presently accepted 
Charter grounds of challenge under principles of vagueness and 
overbreadth [footnote omitted]. Indeed it may be easier to apply. The 
resolution of the harm principle issue will provide a good barometer of 
how activist the present Supreme Court chooses to be.65 
The majority in the Clay trilogy refused to constitutionalize the 
“harm principle” because (1) “there is no sufficient consensus that the 
harm principle is vital or fundamental to our societal notion of criminal 
justice, (2) “there [is no] consensus that the distinction between harm to 
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others and harm to self is of controlling importance, and (3) “the harm 
principle is not a manageable standard against which to measure depri-
vation of life, liberty or security of the person”.66 At the risk of sounding 
like a sore loser, and with the greatest of respect to the majority, the 
support they provide for each of these three propositions is weak, at 
best.  
First, regarding the majority’s contention that there is insufficient 
consensus about the fundamental nature of the “harm principle”, the 
majority, in contrast to Arbour J. and Braidwood J.A. in the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, fails to make mention of the overwhelming 
number of credible sources which recognize the importance of harm as a 
justification for resort to the criminal sanction.67 Instead, the majority 
simply asserts that “these sources, read in context, do not support the 
‘harm principle’ as defined by the appellants”68 and then goes on to note 
that included within the appellant’s long list of authorities that support 
the existence of the “harm principle” were J.F. Stephens and a 1982 
report by the Law Reform Commission, both of which suggest that 
justificatory “harm” extends to harms beyond those mentioned by Mill 
in his original formulation of the “harm principle” centuries ago. As 
Arbour J. observes, the majority’s analysis focuses on the wrong issue. 
The issue in the Clay trilogy of cases was not whether Mill’s conception 
of a “harm principle” was right or wrong. The issue in these cases was 
simply whether, since Mill, has a solid consensus developed that recog-
nizes “harm to others” as an organizing principle of criminal law. 
In the Clay trilogy, Arbour J. (at paras. 226 to 244 of Malmo-
Levine) makes a compelling case for why “harm to others” has been 
well accepted, both by academics and by earlier Supreme Court of Can-
ada decisions, as a principle of fundamental justice — a case which 
seems unanswered by the majority’s opinion. The only answers pro-
vided by the majority to Arbour J.’s arguments on this point are (1) a 
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one-sentence passage from Rodriguez, a case in which the focus had 
been on the autonomy of the individual and not on whether the conduct 
caused harm to others, and (2) a reference to the fact that “Canada con-
tinues to have paternalistic law”.69 In terms of this latter point, the ma-
jority refers to the fact that our country has laws which require people to 
wear seatbelts and motorcycle helmets so as to “save people from them-
selves”. Reference is then made by the majority to a very recent policy 
paper from the Law Commission of Canada entitled What is Crime? 
Challenges and Alternatives.70 What the majority seems to have over-
looked, however, is that, in its Report, the Law Commission had this to 
say about those paternalistic laws: 
[E]ven if we agree that certain conduct is harmful, we may disagree on 
whether it ought to be tolerated, prohibited or regulated. It is often claimed 
that if conduct is harmful to others, it warrants a more serious response. 
However, in a society that recognizes the interdependency of its citizens, 
such as universally contributing to healthcare or educational needs, harm 
to oneself is often borne collectively. There are pressures to regulate and 
control conduct that primarily harms the individual. The requirements to 
wear a seatbelt or a helmet for certain activities are examples of a 
collective decision to protect people against their own risk taking.71 
In other words, unlike the majority in the Clay trilogy, the Law Com-
mission recognized that out of the range of available governmental 
responses — tolerance, prohibition or regulation — it is only conduct 
causing harm to others that generates a consensus calling for “a more 
serious response” (i.e., prohibition). 
Finally, the majority in the Clay trilogy rejected the “harm princi-
ple” on the basis that they did not think it was a “manageable standard”. 
Apart from the fact that Arbour J. was quite able to articulate how courts 
could and should go about assessing “harm to society” — i.e., a balanc-
ing of the salutary versus the deleterious effects of the prohibition 
within the context of society’s tolerance for the harm caused by the 
conduct or comparable conduct — the majority’s concern for a “man-
ageable standard” appears unduly sensitive. Indeed, the apparent vague-
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ness of the term “undue” was not sufficient to rise to any constitutional 
concern for Gonthier J. in R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society,72 
one of the authors of the majority judgment in the Clay trilogy. The fact 
that, as Arbour J. acknowledged, “harm caused to collective interests... 
is not easy to quantify”, does not mean that the “harm principle” is un-
quantifiable.73 Measuring the “harm” associated with a criminal prohibi-
tion is certainly no more difficult than measuring a crime’s “stigma”74 or 
whether the amount of discrimination associated with a legislative pro-
vision is “discriminatory”.75 
VI. THE ABSENCE OF A “HARM PRINCIPLE”  
IS NOT SUCH A BAD IDEA 
About a month after I had finally read through the Supreme Court 
opinions in the Clay trilogy I noticed that the Court had just released its 
reasons for judgment in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and 
the Law v. Canada (Attorney General).76 I recalled that the case had 
been argued shortly after our hearing in the Clay trilogy and that the 
case had involved issues surrounding the constitutional significance of 
the “harm” associated with criminal conduct. Prior to picking up the 
Court’s reasons for judgment, that is all that I had remembered about the 
case. By the time I had reached the end of the majority’s opinion in that 
case, I thought that, like Alice, I had fallen through the looking glass. 
Having read the majority judgment, I was left scratching my head as to 
how it was that almost the same group of judges had rejected our “harm 
principle” arguments only a month earlier: 
... a reasonable person acting on behalf of a child, apprised of the harms of 
criminalization which s. 43 avoids, the presence of other governmental 
initiatives to reduce the use of corporal punishment, and the fact that 
abusive and harmful conduct is still prohibited by the criminal law, would 
not conclude that the child’s dignity has been offended....77 
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In Canadian Foundation, the applicants had brought a constitutional 
challenge to the Parliament’s failure to criminalize certain conduct; that 
is, the applicants were complaining that Parliament had shirked its con-
stitutional duty to prevent harm by “decriminalizing” assaults upon 
children by virtue of the corrective force defence afforded by section 43 
of the Criminal Code.78 In rejecting the applicants’ constitutional claim, 
the majority observed: 
The criminal law is the most powerful tool at Parliament’s disposal. Yet it 
is a blunt instrument whose power can also be destructive of family and 
educational relationships. As the Ouimet Report explained: 
To designate certain conduct as criminal in an attempt to control anti-
social behaviour should be a last step. Criminal law traditionally, and 
perhaps inherently, has involved the imposition of a sanction. This 
sanction, whether in the form of arrest, summons, trial, conviction, 
punishment or publicity is, in the view of the Committee, to be employed 
only as an unavoidable necessity. Men and women may have their lives, 
public and private, destroyed; families may be broken up; the state may be 
put to considerable expense: all these consequences are to be taken into 
account when determining whether a particular kind of conduct is so 
obnoxious to social values that it is to be included in the catalogue of 
crimes. If there is any other course open to society when threatened, then 
that course is to be preferred. The deliberate infliction of punishment or 
any other state interference with human freedom is to be justified only 
where manifest evil would result from failure to interfere.  
(Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Toward Unity: 
Criminal Justice and Corrections (1969), at pp. 12-13).79 
As I read this, I thought to myself, “I could not agree more!” It was not 
long before I realized that my concurrence was undoubtedly due to the 
fact that this was the exact same argument and the exact same passage 
that we (and Braidwood J.A.) had relied upon in the Clay trilogy to 
support the constitutional recognition of the “harm principle”. 
Upon further reflection, however, I began to reluctantly accept the 
wisdom of the majority’s approach in Canadian Foundation and, by 
necessary implication, the majority’s decision in the Clay trilogy. De-
spite my everlasting belief (based upon an extensive scientific eviden-
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tiary record) that the criminal prohibition on marijuana possession is the 
paradigmatic example of a “stupid” criminal law, the Canadian Founda-
tion case revealed the potential danger of the kind of judicial activism 
encouraged by a constitutionalization of the “harm principle”. While I 
would never urge our courts to shy away from their constitutional duty 
to engage in substantive review of legislation which conflicts with the 
Charter, I have come to appreciate that the constitutionalization of a 
“harm principle” could “cut both ways”; that is, it could cut away at 
both liberties and prohibitions. This is not intended as either a criticism 
or a comment on the merits of the constitutional claim brought in Cana-
dian Foundation, but rather is simply to say that, were the applicants in 
that case to have succeeded, it would have left the door open to any 
public interest group launching a constitutional challenge to the absence 
of a criminal prohibition. More importantly, had we been able to per-
suade the Supreme Court in the Clay trilogy to recognize the “harm 
principle”, it would have strengthened the argument of the applicants in 
Canadian Foundation that where conduct is associated with non-trivial 
harm then Parliament has a constitutional duty to criminalize that con-
duct. Had that been the result, we may well have won the battle but lost 
the war.80 
VII. CONCLUSION 
With the preceding discussion in mind, I return to the question 
posed at the outset: does section 7 of the Charter have a role to play 
when it appears that there is no constructive purpose behind a criminal 
prohibition? In view of the decision in the Clay trilogy, Parliament has 
free rein to criminalize any conduct which may cause non-trivial harm 
to the actor or to society; anything from amusement park rides to zoo-
keeping.81 Moreover, to the extent that earlier Supreme Court cases had 
offered alternative means for substantive constitutional challenges to 
                                                                                                                                
80  For example, disgruntled opponents of marijuana consumption could have launched 
a constitutional claim for criminalization of the possession of “junk food” as there is clearly 
evidence that consumption of junk food is associated with serious harm; e.g., obesity, diabe-
tes, heart disease, high blood pressure, arthritis and/or age-related mascular degeneration. 
81  Given the dangers inherent to these sources of entertainment, there would be nothing 
stopping Parliament from “regulating” the operation of them by resorting to the criminal 
sanction, namely, imprisonment and a criminal record. 
194  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
overreaching and/or unnecessary criminal offence provisions, the major-
ity judgment in the Clay trilogy severely restricts them as well. From a 
social activist’s point of view, the Clay trilogy would seem to have been 
a resounding failure. Nevertheless, with the benefit of hindsight offered 
by the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Canadian Foundation for 
Children, Youth and the Law, it may well be that the majority in Clay 
came to the right result (even if, arguably, for the wrong reasons). As 
the constitutional challenge in Canadian Foundation demonstrates, a 
constitutionally enshrined “harm principle” could equally compel crimi-
nalization of conduct which Parliament had otherwise decriminalized. 
Citizens who were disposed to make a case for the criminalization of 
relatively harmless, though “offensive” (i.e., immoral) recreational be-
haviour (e.g., rave dance parties), would be empowered to launch con-
stitutional challenges urging the courts to criminalize such behaviour. 
That kind of power is too much, even for me. 
 
